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James W. McKinsey, Jr.
In the space of 176 years the Lower Mississippi 
has shortened itself 242 miles.
Therefore, any calm person who is not blind 
can see…that 742 years from now the Lower 
Mississippi will be only a mile and three-
quarters long, and Cairo (Illinois) and New 
Orleans will have joined their streets together, 
and be plodding along comfortably under a 
single mayor and a mutual board of aldermen.
—Mark Twain 
Life on the Mississippi, 1874
Prediction is very difficult, especially 
if it is about the future.
—Niels Bohr
In the late 1960s and early 1970s a number of groups
popularized the notion of the “Limits to Growth.”
Prominent among those groups were academics associ-
ated with Washington University in St. Louis and with
MIT, and a broad collection of people who called them-
selves the “Club of Rome.” They based their arguments
primarily on three factors: rapid population growth
experienced in many countries during the 1950s and
1960s; stagnant food output, and consequent near-
famine, in many areas of the world in the mid-60s; and
an appeal to the finite, seemingly-fixed physical quanti-
ty of petroleum and other resources [and consequently
diminishing returns to labor] with which to meet the
looming Malthusian challenge. They often punctuated
their arguments with expressions of dismay or outrage
at the unsustainable global maldistribution of economic
activity and reward: that one nation, home to three per-
cent of the world’s population, consumed one-third of
the world’s energy and disproportionally depleted vari-
ous other resources. Their dire prediction was imminent
economic collapse, to be followed by apocalyptic ecolog-
ical, social and political disaster.
Some of their advocacy became more shrill with the
OPEC oil embargo of the early 1970s, held up as both
proof and foretaste of the disruption to come. Yet thirty
years later these dire predictions have failed to material-
ize and it may be that the only clubs of Rome known to
this journal’s readership are AS Roma and SS Lazio of
the Premier League. Niels Bohr was right: prediction is
indeed very difficult.
Most economists were skeptical of the “Limits to
Growth” hysteria, because it seemed to spring from an
understanding of human behavior which was mecha-
nistic, rigidly determined: if individuals or groups have
been doing something, they will continue to do the
same. The analysis seemed not to rise above simple
extrapolation.
In contrast, the economic approach focuses on three
things: the environment [both opportunities and con-
straints, some of which are made known through
prices] in which people find themselves, their goals, and
their choices and behavior in pursuit of those goals. A
hallmark of that approach is the idea that when the
environment changes, people adjust, make different
choices, change their behavior in response. Although
Mark Twain was not a trained economist, he under-
stood the adjustment process well enough to parody
those who would assert that trends go on indefinitely,
that behavior continues unchanged.
Each of the three factors which underlay the “Limits to
Growth” arguments turned out not to have continued
as the Cassandras had expected. Population growth
rates moderated: the demographic transition continued
its course, and birth rates declined a few decades after
death rates had fallen. Quantities of resources alleged to
have been fixed, limited, turned out to be responsive to
scarcity-induced higher prices, as economists expect
[but the impetus towards moderation and conservation,
suppressed perhaps in our age of SUVs, did receive rein-
forcement in those times—another effect of higher
prices]. And perhaps most dramatic of all, food output
was far from stagnant: increases in rice and wheat pro-
ductivity and output were so great in the late 1960s and
early 1970s that the phenomenon was perhaps infelici-
tously termed the “Green Revolution.”
The story of the “Green Revolution” is instructive to us
on several levels: biological, organizational and econom-
ic. Biologically, the varieties (“landraces”) of food crops
selected over many generations by farmers in South and
Southeast Asia and large areas of Latin America, well-
adapted to highly-specific local soil, climate, pest and
disease, husbandry and other conditions, had mostly
reached their maximum yield. Over the previous half
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century or so farmer’s adaptations, primarily in higher-
income, usually temperate areas, had been greatly
assisted by formal research programs at agricultural uni-
versities and state experiment stations. An early success
was the development of hybrid corn; other early success
came in sugar cane, bananas, and various food grains.
Often the breeding goal was explicitly to increase yields.
But just as frequently it was to confer host plant resis-
tance to insects, diseases, or to various abiotic stresses
including drought and heat.
Significantly less progress had occurred for food crop
varieties grown in Asia; with little idle land available to
bring under cultivation, it appeared that food output in
those areas had neared its limits. What might seem an
obvious solution was to add more inputs—especially
fertilizer—to each hectare of land. However, few Asian
landraces were very responsive to increased nutrient
input, and those that were, especially in rice, tended to
become top-heavy with the extra grain, and “lodge”:
fall over and rot on the ground or in the flooded paddy.
But agronomists had begun to assemble and catalog col-
lections of germplasm, samples of as many varieties of
each crop as they could find
worldwide, with as many differ-
ent traits and characteristics as
nature provided. And advances in
basic biology improved the ability
of crop breeders to cross varieties
in many ways, attempting to
combine desirable traits. 
Organizationally, much of the
most important early work was
focused in international centers
supported by major foundations
and the World Bank; the two
most successful early locations
were CYMMYT in Mexico, deal-
ing with wheat and maize, and
IRRI in the Philippines, dealing
with rice. But the work required
cooperation among scientists
from several disciplines, and in many locations, from
international centers to national and local agricultural
experiment stations, in distinct agroclimatic regions
within nations. Scientists at IRRI discovered that a gene
from the Taiwanese rice variety Dee-Geo-Woo-Gen was
both easy to transfer to the popular indica and japonica
rice varieties, and would convey to those varieties a
much shorter, stiffer stalk and a remarkable ability to
grow satisfactorily in many low-input regimes while
responding very well to fertilizer applications. Some
called the new variety “miracle rice”;  hyperbole, to be
sure, but understandable, as IRRI’s first released variety
[IR-8] and its descendants spread throughout South and
Southeast Asia, further adapted by crosses with indige-
nous varieties performed at local experiment stations,
often increasing yields by more than one third over 
the traditional landrace varieties, averting the specter 
of famine.
Economically, this is a classic tale of adaptation in
response to scarcity, scarcity made known partly
through an increase in food prices, scarcity which was
manifested partly in a humanitarian resolve by officers
of foundations and international institutions. As often
happens, because of this adaptation rice and wheat out-
put increased substantially enough that they ultimately
became relatively less expensive in many places,
enabling both private and public expenditures later to
be redirected elsewhere, thereby accelerating more gen-
eral economic development. This story is also a classic
tale of a mix between public and private activity, a
strong example of public programs which benefit both
producers and consumers. Importantly, the private
activity consisted of individual farmers independently
deciding to plant the new varieties on their land;  nearly
all of the research and breeding and varietal develop-
ment was performed by public institutions, both
national and international,
with almost no private firms
involved in the research, breed-
ing or seed dissemination.
There were no plant patents 
at the time, and that absence 
of protection for the intellectu-
al property represented by 
new plant varieties removed
any incentives for private firms
to engage in any related activi-
ty apart from hybrid crops
[which did not produce ger-
minable—growable—seed,
thus requiring that farmers 
buy seeds from the inventing
company every season].
The “Green Revolution” offered
economists a major opportuni-
ty to participate and to study, as literally hundreds of
economists played varied roles during and after the
major crop breeding activities. One notable example is
Robert Evenson, an economist now at Yale, who had
worked at IRRI and the neighboring University of Los
Baños in the early ’70s. He has since informally led a
loose confederation of agricultural economists around
the world who have studied the economic impact of
agronomic research in general, new crop varieties in 
particular. I have collaborated with him since the early
1980s in studying the varied but substantial impact of
new crop varieties in India.
Three and four decades later, all echoes of the “Limits to
Growth” seem to have faded to silence. But taking its







































change, fostering the fear that once again global natural
forces may disrupt the planet’s economies in general,
and food supplies in particular.
Although most U.S. energy companies deny that any-
thing is happening, and the rest of the Executive branch
tries to squelch EPA findings, there is very strong con-
sensus within the serious scientific community that
human activity has increased the atmospheric concen-
tration of carbon dioxide and other so-called greenhouse
gases over the past century or so to the point where the
earth’s climate is being affected. The impact is seen in
very slowly rising mean temperatures, more volatile
temperature and rainfall patterns including an evident
increase in the frequency and severity of storms, and
apparently some change in weather patterns such as the
jet stream. Just as was true before, this increased con-
cern sometimes spawns hysteria, as perhaps reflected in
the recent movie The Day After Tomorrow; it sometimes
also tempts people again into prediction by mere extrap-
olation, counting the years until coastal cities are inun-
dated by rising sea levels as the polar ice caps melt, or
counting the years until the Sahara desert, continuing
to expand at recent rates, grows like Twain’s Mississippi
to extend from the headwaters of the Nile to the
Mediterranean. 
But beyond the hysteria is more restrained, more
nuanced, more plausible concern. Because climate—
temperature, rainfall amounts and patterns, sunlight—
is fundamental to crop growth, and because therefore
crops which are suited, successfully adapted, to one 
prevailing agroclimatic regime often perform very 
poorly in even slightly different regimes, it is reasonable
to wonder whether global climate change would reduce
food output. Numerous laboratory and greenhouse
studies, supported by some mathematical models, 
suggest that it would, although for many reasons 
these studies cannot be conclusive.
Recent field evidence of the effect of climate change 
on agriculture comes in intriguing forms. In August
botanists revealed that magnolia and dogwood trees in
Boston’s Arnold Arboretum were blooming five to eight
days earlier than a century ago; they attributed the
change to warmer spring temperatures. Ironically, at 
the birthplace of the “Green Revolution,” botanists at
IRRI recently announced a slight decrease in the yields
of specific rice varieties continually grown in their
experimental plots over the past decade or two. While
admitting that they were not sure of the precise biologi-
cal mechanism responsible for the decreased yield, they
attributed it to a small observed increase in minimum
night-time temperatures during the early growth phases
in the spring.
Economists who study climate change and its implica-
tions understand adjustment just as well as did Twain,
and understand the role of agricultural research and the
development of new crop varieties in that adjustment
just as well as did the economists who studied the
“Green Revolution.” Of course, many of the economists
are the same: Evenson and I have continued to study
the economic impact of research, and new crop vari-
eties, in India in the context of climate change. We have
found what we believe is compelling statistical evidence
that well-organized, locally-adapted breeding programs
can, and probably have begun to, mitigate harmful
effects of higher temperatures and other manifestations
of anthropogenic climate change.
Logic and history reinforce our evidence. The fact that
varieties of rice which were selected for their optimal
performance in one climate regime suffer a lower yield
in another regime does not mean that average cultivated
rice yields must decline as climate changes. It simply
means that there is scope for continued breeding activi-
ty, continuing and more closely focusing on the
decades-old experiences accumulated crossing strains 
of the crop which are tolerant of higher temperature
with varieties exhibiting other desirable characteristics,
selecting the best and releasing them for further local
adaptation.
Scientists have had dramatic success with similar
efforts, adapting soy beans, a very high-value crop 
previously suited only for warm regions such as the
lower Midwest in the United States or portions of
northern Brazil, making it tolerant of cooler weather
and thus enabling its profuse and highly profitable
growth in northern Iowa, Minnesota, and southern
Brazil. The scientific challenge to breed heat tolerance
into a plant is biologically no different from, nor more
difficult than, the successfully-mastered challenge to
breed cold tolerance into soy beans. The international
collections of germplasm contain strains of rice grown
in such a variety of agroclimatic regimes that many 
possible crosses exist. And the appearance in the 1990s
in nearly every nation of plant patents has created an
incentive for private seed-producing firms to devote
their considerable scientific and financial resources to
the task alongside the now-mature international and
national research centers.
Climate is changing; farmers will adapt. National and
international research systems, in some cases working
alongside or competing with private seed companies,
will facilitate that adaptation. With deference to Bohr,
we cannot predict the exact outcome of the research
and the adaptation which it fosters, but we can be 
confident that mere extrapolations of harm will 
prove incorrect.
—James W. McKinsey, Jr. is Assistant Professor of Economics
 
